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India after the 2014 General Elections:  
BJP dominance and the crisis of the third party system  
 
Arjan H. Schakel, Chanchal Kumar Sharma and Wilfried Swenden 
 
Abstract 
This article critically assesses claims that India has entered a new party system after the 2014 
general elections, marked by renationalisation with the BJP as the new ‘dominant’ party.’ To assess 
these claims, we examine the electoral rise of the BJP in the build-up to and since the 2014 general 
elections until the state assembly elections in December 2018. We illustrate and explain the rise 
of the BJP in the Hindi-heartland and in areas beyond its traditional catchment area. We show that 
this rise is territorially uneven and has come primarily at the expense of Congress’ and regional 
party support, but not of regionalist parties which consolidated or even expanded their vote share. 
Overall, we argue that despite the emerging dominance of the BJP, a core feature of the third party 
system—a system of binodal interactions—has remained largely intact albeit in a somewhat 
weaker form. Furthermore, by comparing the post 2014 Indian party system with key features of 
first three party systems, we conclude that the rise of the BJP has thrown the third-party system 
into crisis, but does not yet define the consolidation of a new party system. We use electoral 
outcomes, measures of party nationalization (Bochsler 2010) and party system congruence 
(Schakel 2013) to make this claim. [211 words] 
 





This article seeks to substantiate claims about the changing nature of the Indian party 
system, following the 2014 general (national parliamentary) elections and 30 state (subnational) 
legislative assembly elections which have taken place since. More in particular, it examines and 
challenges the assertion that the 2014 general elections marked the start of a ‘fourth party system’ 
in India’s post-independence electoral history.  
 
Scholars of Indian party politics have identified three distinctive phases or ‘party systems’ in 
India since 1952 (Yadav 1999), the first two of which (1952-1989) were marked by the dominance 
of the Congress Party, the party which led India into independence and shaped its constitution. 
Although Congress maintained its hold on central politics until 1989, scholars have usually 
identified two distinctive phases within this period of one-party dominance. The first phase or so-
called ‘first party system’ lasted from 1952 until 1967. In this period, Congress dominated the 
centre and nearly all of the Indian states. The second party system covered the period between 
1967 and 1989. In this period, Congress retained its dominant position at the national level (except 
for a brief period between 1977 and 1979) but faced fiercer competition from other parties in the 
states with which it engaged in an often-confrontational way. This period was also marked by 
higher electoral volatility and mobilizing strategies of the Congress which varied significantly from 
state to state.  
 
One party-dominance broke down in 1989 with the emergence of a 'post-Congress' polity. 
However, it took a decade of unstable coalitions and minority governments (1989-98) before 
multipartisan tendencies in Indian politics had fully crystallized into a new party system, India’s 
third (Yadav, 1999; Singh and Saxena, 2003). This party system was marked by electoral 
competition between two pre-electoral coalitions, namely the BJP-led National Democratic 
 2 
Alliance and the Congress-led United Progressive Alliance— it became known as the ‘two national 
alliances’ (National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution, 2002) or binodal1 
system (Arora and Kailash, 2013). This pluralized party system also coincided with diverse forms of 
party competition in the states and the de facto decentralization of the Indian polity.2 
 
 Nonetheless, with the comprehensive and resounding reelection of the incumbent United 
Progressive Alliance (UPA) in the 2009 elections to a second term, in which the Congress Party 
improved its own seat share by over 37 percent, coalition politics in India appeared to be entering 
a new phase. Some observers even proclaimed the beginning of a re-nationalization of India’s 
party system (The Hindu, 2009), while others interpreted the 2009 election results as a sign of its 
further fragmentation (Jaffrelot and Verniers, 2011). The result was also seen as evidence of the 
Congress party’s skill at forging strategic state-level agreements with regional(ist) parties while 
overlooking programmatic or ideological concerns (Kailash, 2009). Overall, the prognosis was that 
a return to single-party governments was unlikely in the near future.  
 
All of this changed in 2014 when a landslide victory in the general elections gave a decisive 
majority to the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in the lower house of parliament. Significantly reducing 
the strength of the opposition, it was termed a dramatic result (Sridharan, 2014) and a critical 
turning-point (Palshikar, 2014). The BJP’s majority in the Lok Sabha, with 282 (52%) seats, was both 
unexpected and extraordinary. Furthermore, Congress, with less than 20 percent of the vote was 
reduced to 44 seats in the federal lower house. In this context, the 2014 election result was 
associated with the renationalisation of Indian politics (Vaishnav and Smogard, 2014) in which the 
BJP had become the new ‘dominant’ party’ replacing the Congress as the ‘system-defining’ party 
of the first and second party systems (Chhibber and Verma, 2014). Indeed, some authors have 
gone as far as to identity the 2014 elections as the start of a fourth party system (Chhibber and 
Verma 2018).  
 
In this article we assess the validity of this claim based on a detailed assessment of the 
electoral performance of the BJP and other political parties since the 2014 general elections. We 
argue that these developments demonstrate that at the national level the third party system has 
come under severe strain. In fact, the extent to which party competition is still ‘binodal’ can be 
questioned when the key node in one of the alliances has shrunk to about a fifth of its previous 
size (in seat share) while the other node has now amassed more than half of the parliamentary 
seats on its own, weakening the relative strength of its alliance partners. Yet a measure of 
dominance cannot be based on one single election result alone, certainly not in a multi-level 
democracy such as India. Overall, we make three claims.  
 
Firstly, we support the view that the BJP is asserting its dominance across India’s multi-level 
party system since 2014. Yet, this process is still ongoing, and as we will demonstrate not 
irreversible. Furthermore, ‘one party dominance’ is usually associated with a party which, ‘over 
time, is much more successful in elections, in parliament and the government than any other party’ 
(Bogaards, 2011: 1743-4), yet there is no consensus on how long the party needs to be successful 
                                                 
1 Named as such to reflect bipolar competition, with the Congress and BJP as the ‘nodes’ of two competing alliances.  
2 The relationship between the (de)centralization of the party system and the (de)centralization of the Indian polity is 
contested and a detailed debate falls beyond the scope of this paper. Chhibber and Kollman (2004) argue that 
institutional, especially fiscal decentralization has triggered a more denationalized party system. However, there is 
also a widespread literature which suggests that the advent of coalition politics at the centre with the inclusion of 
state-based or regional parties in government induced a more decentralized polity – more so in practice (e.g. in the 
much less widely practiced suspension of state autonomy by the centre) than in form (constitutional change). For a 
summary and various articles addressing this issue, see Sharma and Swenden 2017.  
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for (for at least two consecutive general elections?), at which levels (federal and/or regional?), and 
on how success is measured (votes and/or seats?). Furthermore, we provide empirical evidence to 
show that BJP dominance does not necessarily meet all of the criteria which Palshikar (2018: 37) 
has attributed to party dominance ‘in the electorate’3; namely (1) the inability of any polity-wide 
party (especially the Congress) to provide a national alternative to the dominant BJP; (2) the 
possibility of ad hoc anti-BJP coalitions at the state level which lack the ‘nodal’ stability of the 
bipolar nodes in the third or post-Congress party system; (3) the progressive decline in the 
electoral support of regional and regionalist parties; and (4) the continued centrality of Modi as a 
strong central leader. Especially on the second and third, and perhaps at the time of writing 
(February 2019) even on the final criteria, the ‘dominance’ of the BJP is not necessarily established 
as much as is often assumed (on this point see also Diwakar 2016).   
 
Secondly, using a Gini-based measure of party nationalization (Bochsler 2010) and a measure 
of party system congruence (Schakel 2013) we demonstrate that while the BJP has improved its 
nationalization score since 2009, the party system as a whole remains as denationalized as the 
party system in previous cycles of general and state assembly elections since 1999.  Furthermore, 
the BJP vote share and its nationalization does not yet parallel that of the Congress during the first 
and even second party systems. 
 
Finally, by comparing  the current Indian party system with the first three party systems, we 
argue that the fourth party system is not yet upon us. This is so for two reasons. Firstly the decline 
in BJP support in some legislative assembly elections and several setbacks in by-elections between 
2015 and 2019 illustrate that inter-party interactions which entail a decisive shift in voter-party 
linkages —a defining feature of party system change ( Sartori 1976, 43-44) 4—are far from 
established. Secondly, the pre-2014 structure of binodal competition marked by pre-electoral 
alliances—a core feature of inter-party interactions (Mair 2012, 94) marking the third party 
system—has  far from collapsed.  
 
In a nutshell, although post 2014 the BJP is dominant, destabilizing the balance in electoral 
support between the two nodes within each alliance (NDA and UPA) and between both alliances, 
to infer from this that the binodal system has given way to a one-party dominant “system” would 
seem to be a conclusion more generous than just.  All we can say is that the system of binodal 
interactions that characterised the third-party system is ‘in crisis’. However, the third party system 
may breakdown if the BJP reproduces electoral support with only small-scale shifts in vote shares 
(leading to an absolute majority of seats) in the 2019 general elections.  
 
In what follows, we first analyze the assertion of BJP dominance in the 2014 General 
elections (section 1) and in the assembly elections which have preceded the national elections and 
followed since (section 2). We analyze the territorial spread of the vote, the campaign methods by 
which it was achieved and the extent to which that support was drawn equally from polity-wide, 
regional or regionalist parties. In the third section we provide evidence to query the start of a 
fourth party system by placing the rise of the BJP into a longitudinal perspective, especially with 
reference to the first and second party systems. The conclusion summarizes our main argument.  
 
                                                 
3 Palshikar (2018) has added criteria which are not linked to electoral performance per se, but associate dominance 
with the social base of the party and its ability to dominate the electoral narrative. We do not touch upon both of 
these explicitly in this article, although briefly make reference to these in our conclusion.  
4 Sartori defines a party system as “the system of interactions resulting from inter-party competition" (1976:44). The 
notion of "system" implies some degree of regularity, that is, continuity of inter-party interactions between elections 
(Sartori, 1976:43). 
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Making Sense of India’s 2014 Election Results: the Assertion of BJP Dominance 
 
In the federal election of 2014, the BJP claimed a landslide victory. The party won 282 of the 
543 seats in the lower house of parliament by itself and 336 seats together with its allies of the 
National Democratic Alliance (NDA), handing an unprecedented defeat to the incumbent 
Congress-led United Progressive Alliance (UPA), which was reduced to 60 seats (of which Congress 
only captured 44). These results illustrate the rise of the BJP (up from just 116 seats in the 2009 
elections). However, some scholars believe that the BJP win with only 31.3 percent of the vote 
share is underwhelming (Moussavi and Macdonald, 2015). The illusion of a landslide, so they 
argue, was the result of the first-past-the-post system, where no minimum threshold of votes is 
required to win elections. Furthermore, although the BJP fielded 427 candidates (out of 543 
single member-districts), its strike rate would have been considerably lower without seat-
sharing arrangements or pre-electoral alliances. The BJP aligned itself with 10 parties in the 
National Democratic Alliance with which it made seat-sharing arrangements ahead of the 
elections (Sridharan, 2014: 21).  
 
Even so, 31 percent is a remarkable feat, especially in view of the fiercely competitive nature 
of elections in the coalition era since 1996. The vote share of the first party within the ruling 
coalition typically ranged between 23 to 28 percent. The BJP’s success in 2014 unfolded in a 
context in which elections had become even more contested (in 34.8 percent of constituencies 
there were more than 16 contestants as against 28.6 percent in 2009 (Election Commission of 
India, Electoral Statistics, 2016). The results were also dramatic because the BJP improved its vote 
share by 12.5 percent whereas the support for Congress dropped by 9.2 percent.  
 
The 2014 election results are a telling demonstration of the BJP’s ability to maximize the 
vote-to-seat multiplier, or vote efficiency, to swing tightly-contested seats in its favour. However, 
to what extent was the rise of the BJP territorially (un)even, and why? The question is relevant 
because the BJP —being traditionally weak in the Northeast and South of India— has long been 
seen as a Hindi Belt (north and central India except Punjab and Jammu and Kashmir) and western-
India-centered party. To answer this question we organize India’s states under five categories: 
Hindi Belt, East, North, North-East, South, and West (see online Annex, Table A1). We compare the 
results of the 2009 and 2014 Lok Sabha elections. Figure 1 reveals both the absolute and relative 
performance of the BJP in different states. In relative terms we compare low (0-10 percent vote 
share), middle-level (11-30 percent vote share) and high-level support states (31-50 percent vote 
share Anything beyond the 50 percent mark would signify exceptionally high support levels. The 
entire Hindi Belt and the West gave high and middle-level support to the BJP in 2009, while most 
of the South and the North-East expressed low levels of support. Karnataka (South) and Arunachal 
(North-East) were exceptions as high-level support states and Assam (North East) was among the 
middle-level support states. 
 
Figure 1 shows that in 2014, although the BJP vote advanced in nearly every state, the gains, 
relative to 2009 elections, were highest (11-25 percent increase) among the middle-level support 
states, followed by the high-level support states. The middle-level support states of the Hindi Belt 
such as Haryana, Bihar, and Uttar Pradesh and the North Eastern state of Assam became high-level 
support states, as the BJP more than doubled or even tripled its vote share. High-level support 
states in 2009 such as Gujarat (West), Uttarakhand, Rajasthan, Himachal, Madhya Pradesh (all 
Hindi Belt), and Goa (West) forged ahead to become ultra-high support states with more than 50 
percent support for the BJP in 2014. Quite surprisingly, however, the BJP’s vote share did not 
increase significantly in many of the low-level support states (less than five percent increase) 
except West Bengal (10.7 percent increase) and Meghalaya (8.9 percent increase). Nonetheless 
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even the relatively smaller gains in the North-East, South, and East of India mark a substantial 
achievement since support for the BJP and its ideology in these regions was almost entirely absent 
before. Furthermore, the exceptions among them, for the same reason, require some further 
explanation.  
 
Figure 1. BJP vote shares in the 2009 and 2014 federal elections for 29 states.  
 
Notes: See Table A1 in the Annex for the full names and classification of the states.  
 
In West Bengal, significant relative gains pushed the BJP into third position. Given that the 
CPI (M) lost more than 10 percent of the vote, scholars have speculated on the BJP’s potential to 
overtake the CPI as the largest opposition party within the state. By crossing the 20 percent 
support mark in Odisha, the BJP could also emerge as a credible alternative to the Congress there. 
Relative vote gains were also considerable in Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu, even though 
support for the party remains well below the 10 percent mark in both states.  
We argue that the impressive performance of the BJP in some states which are generally 
averse to the Hindutva (Hindu nationalist) politics of the BJP can be attributed to the campaign 
style and messaging of Prime Ministerial candidate Narendra Modi. In his relentless campaign 
rallies, Modi, in addition to playing the development card, sought to broaden his territorial support 
by appealing to distinctive regional sentiments and customs. This ‘regional messaging’ took place 
despite the fact that the BJP’s campaign organization was highly centralized. A review of the 
speeches which Modi delivered in various parliamentary constituencies reveals that he not only 
wore the traditional headgear and costume representative of each state and spoke a few opening 
sentences in the appropriate regional language, but also that he attempted to play to the 
sentiments of regional parties (the online annex provides an overview of the main campaign 
strategies per state). His speeches extolled the ideals of revered state leaders from an earlier era, 
while criticizing the current regional state leaders for not upholding their predecessors’ ideals and 
not being true to their own people. He even focused on constituency-specific local issues and 
promised favors tailored to each state’s regional concerns and local situation. He also assured 
states of a specific formula to achieve double-digit growth. He promised to deliver the best public 
services in each state, citing the example of Gujarat, which he claimed to have modernised himself 
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Paralleling the uneven vote share across different categories of Indian states, the BJP’s gain 
in seat share in the 2014 elections remained territorially uneven. The party won 208 seats in just 
eight states adding 142 seats to what it had won in 2009. The gains were strongest in Uttar Pradesh 
(+61), Maharashtra (+14), Bihar (+10), Madhya Pradesh (+11), Gujarat (+11), Rajasthan (+21), 
Haryana (+7), and NCT of Delhi (+7). In five other states the BJP won 50 seats, either maintaining 
or consolidating its seat share: Karnataka (17), Assam (7), Jharkhand (12), Chhattisgarh (10), and 
Himachal Pradesh (4). The BJP also managed to seize all constituencies from incumbents in Jammu 
and Kashmir (3) and Uttarakhand (5). Seven major states resisted the rise of the BJP, restricting 
the party to 8 seats in total: West Bengal (2 out of a total of 42), Tamil Nadu (1/39), Andhra Pradesh 
(2/25), Odisha (1/21), Telangana (1/17), Kerala (0/20), and Punjab (1/13). From 11 seats in the 
North East (excluding Assam) the party could win only one. Thus, while the BJP could not make a 
breakthrough in these seven major states, its victory in terms of seat share was formidable in the 
Hindi Belt and the Western states, geographic areas in which it stood strong already.  
 
A second and related way of trying to make sense of territorial variations in the vote is to 
assess where the BJP vote gains have come from by type of party. Is this primarily from other 
polity-wide parties, from cross-regional parties or from regional or regionalist parties? We define 
a polity-wide or national party as a party which participates in general and state assembly elections 
in more than half of the states whereas a cross-regional party is a party which participates in more 
than one but less than half of the states. Regional and regionalist parties share a state-specific 
following, but as Adam Ziegfeld (2014) observed, regionalist parties, unlike regional parties, 
emphasize regional or cultural nationalism or represent concerns that are specific to their state. 
Based on this definition, we have identified sixty-nine parties in India which are regional or 
regionalist. The online appendix provides a list of parties and their categorization as polity-wide, 
cross-regional, regional, regionalist, independent candidates, or other (all remaining parties that 
contested elections). We zoom in on longitudinal shifts in the support base for these various 
parties in the final section, but here we only discuss findings which compare the 2014 general 
elections with the 2009 general elections. Figures 2A and 2B present the share of the vote and 
seats in general elections per type of party.  
 
Figure 2A demonstrates a modest rise in the vote share for polity-wide parties in the 2014 
general elections compared with the 2009 result. The BJP gained about 12.5 percent whereas the 
Congress vote share dropped about 10 percent. Not all voters who deserted the Congress party 
embraced the BJP. As Oliver Heath (2015) observed, the BJP was able to attract only 33 percent of 
those who voted Congress in 2009. Former Congress support may have gone to regional or 
regionalist parties. The BJP also stole away votes from cross-regional parties, such as the Bahujan 
Samaj Party and the Communist Party of India and various splits from this party. Furthermore, it 
eroded the support base of regional parties. For instance, the BJP won 93 seats from Uttar Pradesh 
and Bihar alone where it competed against regional parties and Congress was not even a major 
player. In his analysis of the 2014 general elections, K.K. Kailash observed that regionalist parties 
have been able to withstand the rise of the BJP better than so-called regional parties (Kailash, 
2014; see also Tillin 2015). In fact, Figure 2A shows that support for regionalist parties substantially 
increased between 2009 and 2014 (from 15 to about 20 percent of the vote) in contrast with 
(cross-)regional parties which saw their share of the vote decline (from 22.0 to 17.6 percent). 
Similarly, Figure 2B illustrates that the representation of polity-wide parties in the Lok Sabha based 
on seat shares has continued a slightly upward trend since 2009. The BJP defeated Congress to 
such an extent that it could absorb about 85 percent of all seats attributed to polity-wide parties. 
Indeed, most direct bilateral contests between the BJP and Congress were won by the former 
(Palshikar, 2014). Figure 2B also confirms that regionalist parties have been able to hold onto their 
seats in the Lok Sabha much more successfully than regional parties. In fact, regionalist parties 
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represent more than a quarter of Lok Sabha seats (compared with only about 14 percent in 2004), 
whereas the seat share for regional parties has shrunk from above 9 to scarcely 4 percent.  
 
Figure 2A: Vote share in federal elections per type of party (1952-2014). 
 
Notes: Vote and seat shares are weighted by the size of the state electorate. See Table A2 in the Annex for a 
classification of parties.  
 
 
Figure 2B: Seat share in federal elections per type of party (1952-2014).  
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Is there any relation between the success of the BJP in the Hindi Belt states and its relative 
ability to outperform regional parties more so than the regionalist ones? To answer this question, 
we plot electoral performance of the six party types for the Hindi Belt states. We find that regional 
parties are more often found in the Hindi-heartland where BJP support has been more pronounced 
than in the non-Hindi Belt states of the East, North-East, and South of India. Figures 3A and 3B 
illustrate the share of the vote and representation of seats in the Lok Sabha for the ten Hindi Belt 
states only. In comparison with the polity-wide results shown in Figures 2A and 2B, the support for 
polity-wide parties is substantially higher in the Hindi Belt states. Regionalist parties were never 
strong in the Hindi Belt, but several regional parties (most notably the Samajwadi Party, Janata Dal 
United and the Rashtriya Janata Dal) performed poorly in 2014, with many of their predominantly 
OBC (Other Backward Caste) or Dalit (Scheduled Caste) vote base flocking to the BJP instead. In 
other words, in the Hindi Belt vote changes not merely reflect a move away from Congress to the 
BJP, but equally from regional parties to the BJP.  
 
Figure 3A: Vote share in federal elections per type of party (1952-2014): Hindi Belt states. 
 
Notes: Shown are vote and seat shares weighted by the size of the electorate of the Hindi Belt states: 6 for 1952-
1962; 7 for 1967-1999; 10 for 2004-2014. See Table A1 in the Annex for a classification of states and see Table A2 in 
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Figure 3B: Seat share in federal elections per type of party (1952-2014): Hindi Belt states. 
 
Notes: as for Figure 3A.  
 
 
The Making and Consolidation of BJP Dominance: State Elections in the Build up to and Since 
the 2014 Federal Election 
 
The magnitude of the BJP success in 2014 propelled the party to a more prominent role in 
subsequent assembly elections. The party went on to win no less than 16 state assembly elections 
between October 2014, expanding its control (either on its own or in coalition) to 21 states by 
March 2018 from just five in 2013. How did it happen? Is there an element of continuity in the 
factors that led to the party’s unprecedented victory in the national elections and its impressive 
performance in the subsequent state assembly elections? Did the unexpected win of the BJP in the 
2014 general election now also start to erode the support base of the regionalist parties in 
subsequent state assembly elections as said parties cannot longer exert influence in national 
coalition politics. Equally, has the support base of the Congress Party eroded further in state 
assembly elections since, given the party’s weaker representation in national politics and the 
desire of third parties to align themselves with the BJP as the most likely winner? 
 
To answer these questions, one needs to look at state elections before and after the 2014 
federal election. In fact, we identity the 2012 December Gujarat election as a critical state 
assembly election. Its nationalizing and mobilizing impulse on the electorate can be read by 
contrasting BJP support in state assembly elections between January 2008 and 31 December 2012 
with the party’s electoral following in later state assembly elections. Table 1 confirms the 
December 2012 Gujarat elections as a watershed. In our calculations, states are weighted equally 
by averaging state assembly election results. We compare separately for state assembly elections 
in all 30 states (plus elections in the union territory assemblies of Delhi and Puducherry) and in the 
17 largest Indian states plus Delhi (see online Annex Table A1). The latter count for more than 90 
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Table 1: Vote shares in regional elections. Comparison between elections held before (between 1 
January 2008 and 31 December 2012) versus after 1 January 2013. 
   Votes  Seats 
   BJP  INC  BJP  INC  
State type N   mean st. dev. mean st. dev. mean st. dev. mean st. dev. 
All 30 Before 16.4 15.1 30.7 11.2 19.0 21.9 34.9 21.4 
 41 After 23.8 16.6 26.5 13.8 27.5 26.7 26.7 22.9 
  Change 7.4 ** -4.1 * 8.5 * -8.2 * 
18 largest 18 Before 19.7 14.7 28.0 12.1 22.9 22.9 31.5 18.8 
 25 After 26.8 14.9 25.8 13.4 31.3 26.7 24.6 21.3 
  Change 7.1 * -2.2  8.3  -6.9  
non-Hindi Belt 20 Before 10.6 13.2 31.2 10.7 11.1 19.6 34.8 22.5 
 27 After 16.2 14.9 25.9 13.8 15.9 19.8 27.6 23.6 
  Change 5.6 * -5.8 * 4.8  -7.2  
Hindi Belt 10 Before 28.1 11.6 29.6 12.6 34.8 18.0 35.1 20.2 
 11 After 38.4 7.0 27.8 14.3 50.0 24.3 24.9 22.1 
  Change 10.3 ** -1.8  15.2 ** -10.2  
Notes: * p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05 (one-sided; t-tests with unequal variances assumed). 
 
Table 1 clearly demonstrates that the support for the BJP, in terms of vote share, increased 
significantly in state assembly elections post 2012, rising on average by 7 percent compared with 
state assembly elections held in the period between January 2008 and December 2012. The rise is 
significant, irrespective of whether it is measured across all states, the 17 largest states plus Delhi, 
the Hindi Belt, or non-Hindi Belt states.  
 
Indeed, our findings make a further distinction between Hindi Belt states and the non-Hindi 
Belt states for reasons set out above. Table 1 clearly demonstrates that although the support for 
the BJP rises in both categories of states, that rise was less steep in the non-Hindi states; leaving a 
considerable gap in its performance across both sets of states. Mimicking the rise of the BJP is the 
sharp fall in support of the Indian National Congress, especially in the non-Hindi Belt states. The 
less pronounced fall of the Congress in the Hindi Belt may well be explained by the fact that the 
party was already reduced to a minor party in some of the Hindi Belt states most notably Bihar and 
Uttar Pradesh well before the 2013 assembly elections. 
 
In terms of seat share, the rise of the BJP is especially significant in the Hindi Belt states, 
where electoral support of around 38 percent (Table 1) easily translates into seat shares of more 
than 50 percent. Although the decline in support for the Congress Party generates a significant 
drop in seats shares for the party between 7 and 10 percent across all states, until November 2018 
that drop was momentous in those Hindi Belt states in which Congress has been engaged in bipolar 
competition against the BJP. Successive wins for the Congress in three important Hindi-belt states 
(Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh and Chattisgarh) narrowed this gap to about 10 percent.  
 
In Table 2 below, we have listed the performance of the BJP, Congress Party (INC) as well as 
a set of regional or regionalist parties in order to analyze in how far the rise of the BJP has altered 
party competition in the states. For each state, we list the nature of dominant party competition 
(classified on the basis of their two strongest parties in vote-share between 2004-2009). Party 
competition can revolve around national or polity-wide parties (as in most of the Hindi Belt states, 
except for Uttar Pradesh and Bihar), pit a national against a regional (as in Bihar or Uttar Pradesh) 
or regionalist party (as in much of the North-East, South, East, and Maharahstra), or involve 
competition between two regional(ist) parties (as in Tamil Nadu). We consider assembly elections 
between 2004-2009, 2009-2014 and since 2014 until December 2018 . Table 2 lists for each state, 
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the position of the party holding the largest and the second largest share of votes. Table 3 is a 
summative table, distinguishing between different forms of party competition by listing the 
number of states in which the BJP, INC, a regional or regionalist party comes first or second.  
 
Table 2: Party competition in 30 states since 2004. 
Party State 2004-2009 2009-2014 post-2014 
competition   1st-2nd party 1st-2nd party 1st-2nd party 
National- Chhattisgarh BJP-INC BJP-INC INC-BJP 
National Delhi INC-BJP BJP-AAP AAP-BJP 
 Goa INC-BJP BJP-INC BJP-INC 
 Gujarat BJP-INC BJP-INC BJP-INC 
 Himachal Pradesh BJP-INC INC-BJP BJP-INC 
 Karnataka INC-BJP INC-BJP INC-BJP 
 Madhya Pradesh BJP-INC BJP-INC BJP-INC 
 Rajasthan BJP-INC INC-BJP INC-BJP 
  Uttarakhand BJP-INC INC-BJP BJP-INC 
National- Andhra Pradesh INC-TDP INC-TDP TDP-YSRCP 
(Cross-) Arunachal Pradesh INC-IND INC-NCP INC-BJP 
Regional(ist) Assam INC-AGP INC-AGP INC-BJP 
 Haryana INC-INLD INC-INLD BJP-INLD 
 Jharkhand BJP-IND BJP-INC BJP-JMM 
 Jammu and Kashmir JKN-INC JKN-INC BJP-JKPDP 
 Kerala CPM-INC CPM-INC CPM-INC 
 Maharashtra INC-SHS INC-NCP BJP-SHS 
 Meghalaya INC-NCP INC-IND INC-NPP 
 Manipur INC-IND INC-AITC BJP-INC 
 Mizoram MNF-INC INC-MNF MNF-INC 
 Nagaland INC-NPF NPF-INC NPF-NDPP 
 Odisha INC-BJD BJD-INC BJD-INC 
 Punjab INC-SAD INC-SAD INC-SAD 
 Sikkim SDF-INC SDF-INC SDF-SKM 
 Tripura CPM-INC CPM-INC BJP-CPM 
  Telangana   TRS-INC TRS-INC 
Regional(ist)- Bihar RJD-JD(U) JD(U)-RJD BJP-RJD 
(Cross-) Tamil Nadu ADMK-DMK ADMK-DMK ADMK-DMK 
Regional(ist) Uttar Pradesh BSP-SAP SAP-BSP BJP-BSP 
  West Bengal CPM-AITC AITC-CPM AITC-CPM 
Notes: The table displays the parties that are ranked first or second based on their party vote shares won in state 
election during the time period. Regionalist parties are underlined. The party system characterization is based on the 
2004-2009 time period. See Table A1 in the Annex for the full names of states.  
 
Table 2 clearly illustrates the rising support of the BJP (marked in bold) across all type of state 
party systems since 2014. The party is first in five states in which party competition (based on the 
2004-2009 classification) is predominantly between polity-wide parties (but one down from its 
position in 2004-09). In Delhi the AAP displaced Congress as the largest party in the 2013 and 2015 
assembly elections, but the BJP is the strongest opposition party (and also captured all Delhi seats 
in the 2014 parliamentary elections). With the exception of Jharkhand, the BJP did not come first 
or second among the 16 states in which competition revolved between a national party (Congress, 
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CPI) and a regional(ist) party between 2004-2009. Now it is the strongest party in six states among 
that cohort and it is placed second in a further two. That the BJP has not advanced further is largely 
due to the sustained success of the regionalist parties which, as in the 2014 general elections have 
been able to hold on to their top positions much better than regional parties. Regional(ist) parties 
dominate about as many state assemblies after 2014 as between 2009-14 (see Table 3). Finally, by 
displacing regional parties from power in Uttar Pradesh and Bihar the BJP has become the largest 
in two states in which competition revolved mainly between regional parties, but it has not been 
able to break-through in Tamil Nadu where regionalist parties continue to dominate. 
 
Table 3: Summary of party competition in 30 states since 2004. 
  2004-2009 2009-2014 post-2014 
BJP 1st 7 6 13 
INC 1st 13 13 7 
REG 1st 9 11 10 
BJP 2nd 3 4 6 
INC 2nd 11 12 10 
REG 2nd 15 14 14 
BJP prominent 10 10 19 
INC prominent 24 25 17 
REG prominent 24 25 24 
Notes: The table displays the number of states where the BJP, INC or a regional(ist) (REG) party was the largest (1st) 
or second largest (2nd) party based on vote shares won in the state election. The final rows display sums of first and 
second places per party. 
 
The evolution of the Congress (underlined in Table 2) tells a different story. Except for Delhi 
the Congress remains the second largest party in those states with competition between national 
or polity-wide parties only. As, we will discuss below, it even wrested back control from the 
Bharatiya Janata Party in the November-December 2018 elections in Chhattisgarh, Madhya 
Pradesh, and Rajasthan, three Hindi-heartland states. However, with the exception of Mizoram, 
Kerala, Odisha and Telangana it is not well placed to fight back in those states where polity-wide 
parties compete against regional or regionalist parties. In several of these states the BJP has 
displaced Congress as the largest party or pushed it into third position. Table 3 illustrates the 
advance of the BJP as first or second party at the expense of the INC. Regionalist and regional 
parties more or less held their strength within the party system, albeit more successfully so in case 
of the former.  
 
What enabled the BJP to do so well in most state assembly elections since 2014? Firstly, the 
BJP rode the coattails of its national win in state assembly elections that were held in 2014, shortly 
after the general election (Haryana, Maharashtra, Jammu and Kashmir, and Jharkhand). 
Engineering political defections and caste arithmetic were integral to the plan —for instance, in 
Haryana, the BJP engineered defections by offering tickets to 32 rebel leaders of the Congress and 
the Indian National Lok Dal (INLD), mostly Jats, while at the same time appealing to its core 
constituency among non-Jats (First Post, 2014). Furthermore, in none of the states did the BJP 
announce its chief ministerial candidate. The party’s campaign image built on Modi and his call for 
corruption-free politics was key to its success (see online Annex for an overview of regional 
campaign narratives).  
 
Yet, state Assembly elections in 2015 did not go as planned. In Delhi, the BJP did not win, as 
voters could opt for a strong and corruption-free alternative instead; that of Arvind Kejriwal of the 
Aam Aadmi Party (AAP), a party which like the BJP also mobilized young volunteers in tireless grass-
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roots campaigning (Mathur, 2014). Something similar happened in Bihar, where Nitish Kumar, 
Chief Minister since 2005, provided a credible and ‘corruption-free’ alternative to the BJP. 
Furthermore, playing on regional sentiment, Kumar outmaneuvered Modi: his “Bihari versus 
Bahari” (outsider) slogan catapulted a “Grand Alliance” (in which two regional parties and the 
Congress joined forces) to an outstanding victory in the assembly (Kumar, 2015). Furthermore, 
while Kumar stuck to his model of “inclusive development”, the BJP, by 2015, had appeared to 
have switched back from a development message to identity politics and religious polarization (see 
below). In the following year, the BJP did not make headway in any of the states or union territories 
with strong regionalist parties (Puducherry, Tamil Nadu, and West Bengal), with the exception of 
Assam where it displaced a twice incumbent and increasingly unpopular Congress-government 
(Anant, 2016; Roy, 2016; Seethi, 2016). To counter its replacement with a regionalist party, the BJP 
had forged a rainbow alliance with two such parties, the Asom Gana Parishad (AGP) and the 
Bodoland People’s Front (BPF), and also engineered defections from the Congress party. 
Furthermore, it played to regional sentiments by employing a ‘sons of the soil’ (nativist) campaign 
particularly targeting ‘Muslim or Bangladeshi immigrants’, and unlike in most of the previous state 
assembly elections anointed a local leader as Chief Ministerial candidate ahead of the election 
(Misra, 2016).  
 
Between February 2017 and May 2018, assembly elections were held in Uttar Pradesh, 
Punjab, Goa, Uttarakhand, Manipur, Himachal Pradesh, Gujarat, Meghalaya, Nagaland, Tripura, 
and Karnataka. In Goa, Manipur, and Meghalaya, elections resulted in a fractured mandate with 
the Congress party winning the largest number of seats (Noronha, 2016; Phanjoubam, 2016). 
However, in each of these states, the BJP formed post-poll alliances with regional parties and 
independents to claim majority support. The governors in these states (always appointed by the 
central hence BJP government) promptly invited the BJP to form the state government, ignoring 
the claims of the Congress. In Karnataka, Congress prevented the BJP from adopting this strategy 
again by forging ties with a regional party (Janata Party) and even conceding the Chief Ministerial 
post to that party, despite its smaller share of the vote and seats (The Hindu, 2018). The Nagaland 
elections also gave a hung verdict, with the Nagaland People’s Front (NPF) being the largest party. 
However, the BJP managed to form the government by supporting the Nationalist Democratic 
Progressive Party (NDPP) and gaining the support of smaller parties in the assembly (Phanjoubam, 
2018).  
 
What appears to have set the 2017-2018 elections apart from earlier elections is the 
(selective) move away from development in the campaign (given that job-creation and economic 
growth figures were not living up to expectations) to ‘Moditva’ (a word-play on Hindutva, or Hindu 
nationalism), in which development sits alongside a narrative of Hindu nationalism 
(Tharamangalam, 2016). Regional variations remain: in some states of the North-East (some of 
which have large tribal and/or Christian populations) the BJP reiterated its development promise 
and pledged to use its control of the central government to that effect. However, ‘Moditva’ played 
a more prominent role in the BJP’s traditional strongholds. For instance, in the Gujarat elections, 
to consolidate Hindu votes, Modi declared that a vote for Congress would be a vote for Pakistan 
and that Pakistan wanted the Congress party to win. Such statements were carefully combined 
with the standard rhetoric of development, opposing corruption, controlling black money and 
improving law and order. In Uttar Pradesh and Uttarakhand, the BJP did not project a Chief 
Ministerial candidate, but fought the elections in the name of Modi himself. The party’s efficient 
electoral machine mobilised voters from every nook and cranny (Jha, 2017). The BJP’s IT cell 
created thousands of WhatsApp groups and waged a data war, circulating provocative messages 
to shore up support. Furthermore, Modi carried out a relentless election campaign to project 
himself as a crusader against corruption and black money. By making references to Pakistan-
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sponsored terrorism and India’s surgical strikes in response, he sought to convey his concern for 
national security. He also deflected criticism related to his demonetization initiative (in November 
2016, without advance warning, 85% of cash notes were withdrawn from circulation), defending 
it as a measure aiming to counter black money, dry up funding for terrorism, and facilitating the 
transition into a cashless economy. Amit Shah, the BJP President, engineered defections of OBC 
leaders from the BSP, SP and Congress. In an attempt to split Dalit votes, Modi promised a 
posthumous Bharat Ratna (India’s highest civil honour) for Kanshi Ram (the founder of the BSP and 
mentor of Mayawati, the Dalit BSP leader). The BJP’s emphasis on Moditva and its formidable 
electoral machinery did not work in Punjab though where a twice incumbent SAD-BJP government 
faced a credible and clean leadership alternative in the person of Captain Amarinder Singh, a 
seasoned Congress leader (EPW, 2017). The November and December 2018 assembly elections 
put an even stronger halt to the streak of BJP wins: the BJP lost control of three important Hindi-
belt states (Chhattisgarh, Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan) to the Congress, but only in the case of 
Chhattisgarh on the basis of a decisive gap in the vote. Although Congress lost Mizoram, it retained 
its second place in the state party system (though the BJP increased its vote share by 8 percent 
compared with 2014). The same was true for Telangana also. Thus, in both of the latter states, 
Congress is in a stronger position than the BJP to mount a potential comeback.  
 
 
The Third Party System is in Crisis, but not yet Dead  
 
Notwithstanding the BJPs impressive electoral performance, we issue a note of caution not 
to read too much into these victories just yet. For starters, there are some signs of the Modi wave 
weakening, which can be linked to four observations. 
 
Firstly, the BJP could win only five out of 27 Lok Sabha by-polls conducted since the 2014 
elections. In most of these by-elections, a united opposition defeated the BJP (The Hindu, 2018). 
As a result, the BJP’s share of seats has come down from 282 to 268 , four less than the halfway 
mark of 272.5 Since anti-incumbency will potentially reduce the number of BJP seats in the 2019 
general elections compared with 2014, its reliance on the support of junior partners is likely to 
increase rather than decrease..   
 
Secondly, Figure 4, which is almost a perfect ‘mirror-image’ of Figure 1, shows that the 
party’s hold on voters who had supported Modi in 2014 is declining based on the party’s 
performance in state assembly elections. Thus, the rising support for the BJP has not discouraged 
voters from supporting regional or regionalist parties even though the favorable opportunity 
structure in which these parties could exert influence at the centre in the coalition-era is no longer 
present. Significant exceptions to this trend are the North Eastern states of Nagaland, Manipur, 
Meghalaya where the party’s rise is linked to defections and Tripura, where the BJP was able to 
able to secure the support of the tribal community (Roy, 2018)  
 
Thirdly, by losing three important Hindi-heartland states to Congress in November 2018, the 
BJP has demonstrated its vulnerability. Although in two of these states the contest was extremely 
close, the BJP losses here may have undermined the party’s narrative of invincibility. Such a 
narrative had even driven some erstwhile allies of the BJP to desert the National Democratic 
Alliance as its leadership style was perceived to be arrogant (The New Indian Express, 2018). For 
instance, the BJP lost the support of the TDP (Andhra Pradesh).   
 
                                                 
5 The effective strength of Lok Sabha has been reduced to 522 with two 22 seats falling vacant, as on 06/02/2019. In 
that sense the BJP still holds a majority with 268 seats.  
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Figure 4. BJP vote shares in the 2014 federal election and subsequently held state elections.  
 
Notes: See Table A1 in the Annex for the full names and classification of the states. Madhya Pradesh, Mizoram, and 
Rajasthan are not shown because these states did yet have held their elections at the writing of this election article.  
 
The assembly elections of late 2018 may have forced the BJP into altering its strategy. On 
the one hand, opposition parties feel they can gain votes by raking up issues such as a negative 
growth of employment, farm distress and a sharp rise in agrarian riots, thus exposing weaknesses 
in the BJP’s development record, a key component of its 2014 electoral platform. On the other 
hand, the BJP has felt it necessary to seek ties with some (erstwhile or new) allies, realizing that it 
may need them to win the 2019 general elections. After all, by December 2018, the BJP controls 
only about a third of the state assembly seats and the party only enjoys an absolute majority in six 
out of 18 states in which it currently (co-)governs. Hence, it renewed electoral alliances with Shiv 
Sena (Maharashtra), the Janata Dal (U) in Bihar, the Shrimoni Akali Dal (Punjab), and it has forged 
an alliance with the AIADMK (the largest party of Tamil Nadu) and seeks to extend similar alliances 
in other states where it is weak (e.g. Kerala). Finally, the BJP has mended bridges with erstwhile 
allies in the North-East, e.g. with the Asom Gana Parishad.  In turn, the Congress is seeking to forge 
comparable alliances with regional allies in those states where it knows it cannot win the elections 
on its own. Therefore, the building of a two alliance system centred around the BJP and Congress, 
a core feature of the third party system is crystalizing itself once more ahead of the 2019 general 
elections.  
Finally, Narendra Modi as Prime Minister remains a ‘trump card’ in the view of many voters. 
In the most recent ‘Mood of the Nation Poll tracker’, 46 percent of respondents see him best suited 
to be the next prime minister of India, against 34 percent who back Rahul Gandhi, the Congress 
leader, but in January 2017 these figures stood at 65 and 10 percent respectively (India Today 
2019).  
Apart from cautioning against reading too much in the BJP victories since 2014, we also argue 
that psephologists who declare the start of a fourth party system (marked by BJP one party 
dominance) should do so by placing the core features of the current party system into a 
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Firstly, we can revisit Figures 2A and 2B. Taking into consideration that most of the voters 
who supported polity-wide parties in 1967-1989 in general elections supported Congress or the 
BJP, with about 31 percent of the polity-wide vote the BJP is still some way off the dominant 
electoral and seat share status of the Congress Party in the 1980s, at least based on its 
performance in general elections. Until 1989, this never fell below 40 percent.  
 
Secondly, we can assess the extent to which the BJP has developed into a genuine polity-
wide party, i.e. by amassing its support across as many of the states and territories of the Indian 
federation as possible. The assumption is that dominance is not only a function of overall vote 
share in a national election, but also of the ability to obtain consistently high vote shares across as 
many of the states as possible in national and state elections. Until recently, the BJP was believed 
to score worse on this metric than Congress, given its traditional support in the Hindi Belt and 
West of India. We calculate Daniel Bochsler’s (2010) party nationalization score to illustrate this 
point. This score expresses the extent to which a party obtains similar vote shares across all the 
various states of India. It ranges from 0 (in which case a party is assumed to obtain all its votes 
from within one state) to 1 (which assumes that a party obtains an identical share of the vote 
across all the states of a federation). Importantly, nationalization scores only consider the 
distribution of a party’s vote across the states, but not its size. Table 4 below lists party 
nationalization scores for the BJP and INC in recent national and state elections. The national 
figures list standardization scores in a given national election. The state election scores list 
nationalization scores for the cycle of state assembly elections starting from the date of the 
previous general elections until the date of the general elections for which a date is listed (hence 
the nationalization scores for state elections in 2014 calculate party nationalization on the basis of 
party shares in state assembly elections which have taken place after the federal election in May 
2014).  
 
Table 4: Party nationalization scores.  
Election Federal elections State elections N 
(cycle) BJP INC BJP INC States 
1999 0.71 0.74 0.61 0.71 26 
2004 0.69 0.75 0.61 0.75 29 
2009 0.62 0.77 0.60 0.75 28 
2014 0.71 0.70 0.72 0.66 30 
Notes: Party nationalization scores weighted by the size of state electorates and the number of states (Bochsler 
2010). 
 
Table 4 demonstrates that until the federal election of 2014 the Congress Party had a more 
evenly spread support base than the BJP in federal and state elections. But this situation reverses 
as of the federal elections of 2014 when the BJP and Congress have the same territorial spread 
and their nationalization score is just marginally (0.06) different in the cycle of state assembly 
elections after 2014. Therefore, in time, the data shows evidence of the BJP’s rising nationalization, 
especially in state assembly elections and of a decline in the territorial spread of the INC vote 
across national and state assembly elections since 2014. However, if we situate these figures in a 
more longitudinal perspective, then the nationalization of the BJP remains well below that of the 
Congress Party in the period of the first and second party systems. Indeed, between 1952 and 
1989, the Congress obtained nationalization scores in general and state assembly elections which 
approximated or even exceeded values of 0.9 (Schakel and Swenden, 2018: 16).Given that such a 
territorial spread was combined with vote shares in general elections which exceeded 40 percent 
up until the 1989 national elections, the Congress was comparatively more dominant than the BJP 
today.  
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Finally, the long-term nationalization of a party system can be expressed by calculating 
congruence measures. We look here at one of a range of measures which have been developed by 
Arjan H. Schakel (2013), namely party system congruence. Party system congruence measures the 
extent to which a particular state party system is different from a federal party system and it is the 
result of two sources of variation: the extent to which voters in a general election across the polity 
are different from the electorate within a particular state or union territory in the same (general) 
election and the extent to which voters within a particular state or union territory switch their vote 
between federal and state assembly elections. Hence party system congruence maximizes 
variation in the level of aggregation and the type of election. The more congruent or more 
nationalized a party system, the lower the degree of dissimilarity in electoral outcomes when 
varied by level of aggregation and type of election; the more incongruent or less nationalized a 
party system, the higher the degree of dissimilarity in electoral outcomes when varied by level of 
aggregation and type of election. In Figure 5 below, the x-axis denotes a set of elections, whereby 
each year corresponds with a general election and a set of state assembly elections held thereafter 
until the next general election (the 2014 data incorporate state assembly elections results until 
December 2018). The y-axis denotes dissimilarity values, i.e. the higher the value, the less 
nationalized or congruent is the party system.  
 
Figure 5. Party system congruence between federal and state elections since 1952.  
 
Notes: Shown are dissimilarity scores (percent votes) between a federal election and subsequently held state elections 
held at the same time or after the federal election but before the next federal election. Dissimilarity scores are 
calculated based on Schakel (2013). A box plot distributes values into four groups with each 25 per cent of the 
observations. The values of the first quartile of observations lies in between the bottom line of the box and lower 
whisker, the second quartile in between the bottom line of the box and the middle line of the box which is the median, 
the third quartile between the median and the upper line of the box, and the fourth quartile between the upper line 
of the box and upper whisker. Dots are outliers which have values more than 3/2 times of the upper quartile.  
 
Based on the evidence produced here, the Indian party system remains as denationalized as 
for previous cycles of general and state assembly elections since 1999. Therefore, while we do not 
dispute the dominance of the BJP at the moment, especially in light of Congress’s decline; the 
position of the BJP in the party system does not appear to be strong enough to reproduce the level 
of dominance which marked the more nationalized of especially the first- and second-party 
systems.  
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Conclusion: the 2019 General Election as a Critical Juncture 
 
The BJP’s unexpected rise to federal power in 2014 and the landslide victories in state 
assembly elections held close to the national elections led political scientists to proclaim the 
dominance of the BJP and the arrival of India’s fourth party system. In this article, we took a closer 
look at the data to investigate whether such a conclusion is warranted. The analysis in the first two 
sections clearly demonstrated that the BJP has established a dominant position in the Indian 
political landscape. However, we also observed the resilience of a structural split between the 
Hindu nationalist and regional(ist) domains of politics. The ruling party has not yet succeeded in 
integrating the non-Hindi Belt cultures into its discourse, despite the BJP-RSS effort to produce a 
narrative of inevitability and some electoral successes in the North-East.   
 
Furthermore, the very dominance of the BJP appears to be quite fragile. The party’s rise is 
mainly attributable to its performance in the Hindi Belt, well known for anti-incumbency swings, 
except where the incumbents deliver on economic performance. The BJP, even during the so-
called Modi Tsunami, could not outmaneuver regionalist parties. Finally, opposition unity, 
although difficult to orchestrate given the conflicting ambitions of the opposition leaders, can still 
pose a serious threat to the BJP’s winning streak, as was evidenced by the assembly elections in 
Bihar and Karnataka. More recently, the BJP lost where it appeared to be strongest: in those states 
where it faced a direct competition from the Congress. 
 
To decode the spectacular rise of the BJP, we determined the December 2012 Gujarat 
election to be critical. We disaggregated state-by-state data on vote and seat share of the political 
parties based on two criteria: (a) cultural-locational attributes (Hindi Belt, West, South, East, North, 
and North-East) and (b) the type of political party competition. We argued that the party’s rise is 
linked primarily with its performance in the Hindi Belt and in the Western states where the party 
competes either with a national party or with caste-based regional parties. However, the party has 
made some unexpected advances in both national and state assembly elections in other regions 
as well. In some low-level support states the BJP even managed to form the government by 
securing post-poll alliances with regionalist parties and by engineering defections from rival 
parties. 
 
Overall, we find that the BJP dominance (and the decline of the Congress) has certainly 
thrown the third party system into crisis, although key features of it (the strength of regionalist 
parties, and the forging of competing alliances centered around the BJP and Congress nodes ahead 
of the 2019 general elections) remain intact. Furthermore, despite the impressive set of BJP wins 
in state assembly elections since 2014, the BJP vote is not quite as nationalized as that of Congress 
during the first and second party systems. Equally, in spite of the party’s rise, India’s contemporary 
party system as a whole is more alike the party systems of the coalition-era, marked by 
comparatively low levels of congruence or nationalization of the vote. That said, we acknowledge 
that the current party system stands at a critical juncture.  
 
The outcome of the 2019 elections may well reassert a more recognizable pattern of binodal 
party competition in which the BJP lacks an absolute majority and the NDA and UPA are more 
evenly matched. However, should the BJP reassert itself with an absolute majority, the fourth party 
system may well be upon us. Yet, critical junctures need not necessarily be followed by a new 
pathway; they may well reinforce an existing path. Only a resounding win in the 2019 general 
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elections could seal the return to a one party dominant system, and in fact assert BJP hegemony 
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Modi's Regionalised Campaign For The National Election Of 2014 
 
Andhra Pradesh (Seemandhra) 
Modi praised the state and its people for putting up a strong resistance to the colonial rulers. He 
paid tribute to late Chief Minister N.T. Rama Rao for his dedication and contribution to the state. 
While recognizing the fact that people from Andhra Pradesh emigrate to Gulf countries in large 
numbers, he assured to take care of those who work in Gulf and face problems. He urged people 
to wipe out the Congress government because it had looted Andhra Pradesh. To strike a chord 
with the people, he mused on the fact that his birthday falls on the day Andhraites celebrate the 
Hyderabad Liberation Day. He gave the slogan of ‘Jai Telangana and Jai Seemandhra’ and promised 
to work for the twin goals of development of Telangana and justice to Seemandhra. 
 
Arunachal Pradesh 
To strike a chord with the people of Arunachal, Modi stated that if one ventures into history there 
will certainly be a relation between the Modi clan of the Adi tribe of Arunachal Pradesh and his 
own family. He told that Lord Krishna from Dwarka (Gujarat) had married Rukmini from Arunachal 
Pradesh. He affirmed that murder of Nido Tania, a 20-year-old student from Arunachal, in New 
Delhi was a national shame. Honoring the sentiments of the locals regarding hydro power projects, 
he shared his preference for smaller projects rather than the big ones. He also warned China to 
shed its "expansionist mindset" as no one could snatch Arunachal from India.  
 
Assam 
He praised Assam as a blessed state which had been looted by the state governments. He praised 
son of the soil, independence activist, and first Chief Minister of Assam, the late Gopinath Bordoloi, 
and recalled that it was the BJP government that conferred Bharat Ratna on him during its term in 
the office.  Modi insisted that all Muslim infiltrators from Bangladesh must be sent back but Hindu 
refugees must be accepted and treated well. He stated that Assam had abundant natural 
resources, but still it was poor. It had so many rivers yet there was no water to drink. Law and 
order in Assam are poor because of mis-governance. He reminded people that the country’s PM, 
Manmohan Singh, had been an MP from Assam, yet they were not getting much attention.  
 
Bihar 
Invoking its glorious past, he said that Bihar had always guided the country. It gave the country 
personalities like Buddha, Mahavir, Guru Govind Singh & Jayaprakash Narayan. He targeted the 
Chief Minister, Nitish Kumar, for betraying the people of Bihar. He lauded the contributions of Jai 
Prakash (JP)as a real ‘son of the soil’, but said Nitish had betrayed JP as well. Comparing Gujarat 
and Bihar, he said the Haj quota for Muslims in Gujrat was higher than in Bihar, even though the 
population of Muslims is higher in Bihar. Connecting the two states, he reminded listeners of the 
Satyagraha in Chamaparan (Bihar) and the Dandi March in Gujarat. Since caste arithmetic and 
communal politics is crucial to Bihar, Modi claimed that the next decade would belong to the Dalits 
and the underprivileged; youth need development not division based on caste or religion. He called 
for security and not communal tension. He appealed to both Hindus and Muslims to fight poverty 







Modi reminded people that it was Atal Bihari Vajpayee who created the state of Chhattisgarh 
because he was concerned for poor and marginalised tribals of the area. He focused on the 
commendable work done by the BJP Chief Minister Dr. Raman Singh and profusely lauded him for 
delivering on progress under adverse circumstances. Modi claimed that the Congress led central 
government wanted to destroy Chhattisgarh.  
 
Delhi  
Modi presented his idea of India and expressed his urge to build Brand India. Modi spoke on how 
to improve in various fields like infrastructure, agriculture, railways, and human resources. He 
reiterated his commitment to build a golden quadrilateral of bullet trains, recover black money 
stashed abroad and ensure safety and security of women.  
 
Haryana  
Modi flattered the bravery and the spirit of sacrifice of Haryanvi youth. He expressed admiration 
for their contribution to Indian army and sports. He said that Haryana, the land of “Dan Veer Karna” 
and the battle of Kurukshetra was like a home to him. He reminded people of the Congress misrule 
and involvement of Sonia’s son in law, Robert Vadra, in forcible grabbing of farmers' land in 
Haryana. He promised to improve the train network in Haryana and reiterated his commitment to 
implement the one rank one pension policy.  
 
Himachal  
Modi promised that the BJP, if it came to power would work out specific strategies for 
development of the state. He promised to deliver a well-planned infrastructure for economic 
development and tackling natural disasters.  
 
Jammu and Kashmir  
Modi claimed to have a very close relationship with Jammu & Kashmir. He told that Gujjars of J&K 
were originally from Gujarat and hence he could easily relate to them. He asked why IITs and IIMs 
have not been built in the state of J&K. He promised to develop the state and eliminate 
discrimination and corruption which resulted from the mis-governance of the previous 
governments. He pitched for boosting the tourism and herbal medicine industry in the state. While 
in Jammu he emphasized the need for a debate on Article 370, in Kashmir he reminded people of 
the three mantras given by Atal Bihai Vajpayee: Insaniyat, Jammuriyat, Kashmiriyat.  
 
Jharkhand  
Modi claimed that Jharkhand had coal reserves that were not being explored, so coal was imported 
from outside. Jharkhand gets so much rainfall, yet its water scarcity continues. He blamed the state 
government for not doing anything for skill development and training of the youth, to make them 
employable. He claimed that Jharkhand had the potential to be at par with developed nations of 
the world, but that it had remained backward because of wrong policies of the government.  
 
Karnataka  
He spoke for the urban middle class and asked why government was not thinking about them. 
Were they not citizens of India? He thanked the people of Karnataka for their contributions to the 
field of information technology: for transforming India from a nation of snake charmers to a nation 
of mouse charmers. He spoke of the ‘port-led development’, empowerment of the fishing and the 





Modi offered tribute to the late Maharaja of Travancore. He slammed the central government for 
not properly handling the Italian marines’ case, in which Kerala fishermen were killed. He praised 
Kerala for a high level of literacy but quickly added that it was not because of any government 
initiative. He expressed concern about the spectre of joblessness in Kerala and lashed out at the 
Central government for making no policy for the growth of the service sector in the state. He said 
those in power did not love Kerala and wanted to destroy the state. Communist governments in 
the state have always worked against the interest of the farmers, he said. While speaking at a Dalit 
enclave in Kerala he claimed that he was still a victim of untouchability and that he would make 
the next ten years those of the downtrodden and under-privileged.  
 
Madhya Pradesh  
Modi commemorated the queen Durgavati known for fighting against Muslim rulers.  He termed 
Madhya Pradesh as the land of Narmada and Mandla and praised it as a symbol of victory over 
injustice. He urged the people to compare the BJP’s performance in the state with those of the 
states ruled by the Congress party. He then termed the BJP rule in Madhya Pradesh as “Swarnim 
Karyakaal (Golden era). He praised the Chief Minister for making Madhya Pradesh a reform leader 
from being a ‘bimaru rajya’. He reminded people that Congress never cared about the Tribal 
communities of Madhya Pradesh. It was Atal Bihar Vajpayee, who created tribal ministry to provide 
them education and employment. He held the central government responsible for many problems 
that people in general and farmers in particular were suffering from.  
 
Maharashtra  
He appealed to people not to vote for any particular party, but for India. He reminded them of 
Adarsh scam, which he said was not about one building in Mumbai, but about theft from India’s 
soldiers. He claimed that the BJP will bring back all the black money stashed in Swiss Banks and 
distribute the same amongst people after Lok Sabha elections. He urged Mumbaikars to begin a 
joint protest demanding "Congress free India".  
 
Manipur  
Modi praised the sporting spirit of Manipuri people. Since polo began in Manipur, he promised to 
encourage polo in the state and stressed the importance of promoting sports such as football, 
archery and boxing in the region. He criticised the Manipur government for doing nothing to 
empower Manipuri women and youth.  He promised to construct the Silchar-Imphal and Dimapur-
Imphal roads.  
 
Odisha 
He praised the late son of the soil, Biju Patnaik, and claimed that Odisha’s BJD (Biju Janata Dal) 
government was not doing justice to Biju Patnaik's legacy as young people in the state were not 
getting local jobs and were forced to travel to other states to get work. Modi promised that he 
would create an Odisha that will make Biju Babu happy.  
 
Punjab  
Modi told the people of Punjab that the Sikh community in Gujarat lives happily and that he had 
restored and repaired the Kutch Gurudwara (Sikh worship place) in Gujarat. He raised the problem 
of drug trafficking in Punjab and vowed to end it. He also promised to implement “one rank one 
pension”, a long-standing demand of Army ex-servicemen. He promised to dedicate a TV channel 
to educating farmers and to take other steps to empower farmers. He also promised to implement 
a better policy to make agriculture a more comfortable profession. He expressed his commitment 




Modi hailed Rajasthan as the land of the brave. He applauded the valour shown by mothers in 
Sikar (Rajasthan) who were ready to sacrifice the lives of their sons for the sake of the country. He 
contrasted it with Sonia Gandhi, another mother who was ready to sacrifice the Nation for the 
sake of her Son. He assured the farmers to fix a higher support price of their produce. In order to 
help farmers, he promised to trifurcate the Food Corporation of India (FCI) into three bodies, 
responsible for purchase, storage and transporting the agricultural produce.  
 
Tamil Nadu  
Modi started his speech in Tamil. Since language is a big issue in Tamil Nadu, he praised it as one 
of the few living ancient languages and claimed that he was very fond of Sangam (Tamil) literature. 
He referred to the arrests of Tamil fishermen in Sri Lanka as occurring because the central 
government was not strong, and the Tamil Nadu government was corrupt. He claimed that the 
coalition partners of the UPA government that ruled Tamil Nadu had looted it. He expressed his 
concern for the poor and the conditions of fishing communities. He praised Tamil Nadu for 
becoming one of the most advanced states in the country, but quickly added that it was because 
of hard work and dedication of the people, not because of its government.  
 
Tripura  
Modi said people from other states come and work in Tripura, but the youth of Tripura are not 
given the jobs. He praised the people of Tripura for being well educated and asked them to decide 
for themselves whom to vote for. He favorably compared Gujarat with Tripura.   
 
Uttar Pradesh  
Modi said that UP had great potential to make India prosperous and poverty free. But misrule of 
the state ruling party is creating hindrances. In his speeches, he attacked the Congress and the SP 
for pandering to Muslims. He claimed that no subsidy is given to farmers for rearing cattle, but a 
subsidy is given (to Muslims) for slaughtering cows. He referred to the Muzaffarnagar riots of 2013 
and attacked the state government for its failure to contain riots and to rehabilitate affected 
families.  He branded the incumbent Samajwadi Party (SP) as a "Samaj Virodhi” (anti-social) party. 
He showed concern for the law and order situation and security for women in UP.  He raised the 
issue of poor supply of electricity and water, stating that the UP government had not provided 
basic amenities to the people. He called Varanasi (Modi’s parliamentary constituency in UP), the 
‘capital’ of Hinduism and promised to clean Ganga river, referring to its sacredness.  
 
Uttarakhand  
Modi urged the people of Uttarakhand to give him a chance. He promised that he will do 
everything to fulfil their dreams. He told them that they were suffering because their government 
wanted them to remain poor in order to remain in power.  He said, the problems of youth were 
due to lack of development. So, the youth of Uttarakhand was leaving the state to seek job 
opportunities elsewhere. He pointed out that the capacity of the state to produce electricity was 
not being harnessed.  
 
 
West Bengal  
Inciting the regionalist sentiments of the people of West Bengal, Modi said that the state was 
always the Guru of the Indian nation. But its glory has been lost. Referring to Swami Vivekananda, 
he said that the state must become the nation’s guru once again; only then could India become a 
World Guru. He claimed that Pranab Mukherjee of West Bengal was not considered for the post 
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of Prime Minister by the Congress government, although he was the best and the senior most 
candidate. Modi claimed that the Muslims of West Bengal were deprived of development by 
successive state governments. He raised issues like poor power supply, the declining standard of 
rural education and poor sanitation conditions in West Bengal. 
 
Sources: Collection of Modi’s Speeches at www.narendramodi.in, www.oneindia.com and You tube 
Videos (consulted October 2018).  
 
 
Table A1: Classification and abbreviation of 29 states.  
State abbr. Hindi Belt East North North-east South West 
Andhra Pradesh AP     X  
Arunachal Pradesh AR    X   
Assam AS    X   
Bihar BR X      
Chhattisgarh CG X      
Delhi DL X      
Goa GA      X 
Gujarat GJ      X 
Haryana HR X      
Himachal Pradesh HP X      
Jammu & Kashmir JK   X    
Jharkhand JH X      
Karnataka KA     X  
Kerala KL     X  
Madhya Pradesh MP X      
Maharashtra MH      X 
Manipur MN    X   
Meghalaya ML    X   
Mizoram MZ    X   
Nagaland NL    X   
Odisha OR  X     
Punjab PB   X    
Rajasthan RJ X      
Sikkim SK    X   
Tamil Nadu TN     X  
Telangana TG     X  
Tripura TR    X   
Uttar Pradesh UP X      
Uttarakhand UK X      




Table A2: Classification of parties. 
Party abbr. Party name Classification 
BJP Bharatiya Janata Party Statewide 
BLD Bharatiya Lok Dal Statewide 
INC Indian National Congress Statewide 
INC(I) Indian National Congress (I) Statewide 
JNP Janata Party Statewide 
JNP(JP) Janata Pary (JP) Statewide 
JNP(S) Janata Party (Secular) Statewide 
BSP Bahujan Samaj Party Cross-regional 
CPI Communist Party of India Cross-regional 
CPI(ML) Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) Cross-regional 
CPI(ML)(L) Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) (Liberation) Cross-regional 
CPM Communist Party of India (Marxist) Cross-regional 
JD Janata Dal Cross-regional 
NCP Nationalist Congress Party Cross-regional 
AAAP Aam Aadmi Party Regional 
AD Apna Dal Regional 
AIFB All India Forward Bloc Regional 
AIMIM All India Majlis-E-Ittehadul Muslimeen Regional 
AINRC All India N.R. Congress Regional 
AUDF Assam United Democratic Front Regional 
HJCBL Haryana Janhit Congress (BL) Regional 
JD(S) Janata Dal (Secular) Regional 
JD(U) Janata Dal (United) Regional 
JKNPP Jammu & Kashmir National Panthers Party Regional 
KEC(M) Kerala Congress (M) Regional 
LJSP Loktantrik Jan Samta Party Regional 
MUL Muslim League Regional 
PDA People's Democratic Alliance Regional 
PDF People's Democratic Front Regional 
PMK Pattali Makkal Katchi Regional 
RJD Rashtriya Janata Dal Regional 
RLD Rashtriya Lok Dal Regional 
RLSP Rashtriya Lok Samta Party Regional 
RPI Republican Party of India Regional 
RPI(A) Republican Party of India (A) Regional 
RSP Revolutionary Socialist Party Regional 
SMP Samata Party Regional 
SP Sarvodaya Party Regional 
SWP Swabhimani Paksha Regional 
UMFA United Minorities Front Assam Regional 
ADMK All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam Regionalist 
AGP Asom Gana Parishad Regionalist 
AITC All India Trinamool Congress Regionalist 
AJSU All Jharkhand Students Union regionalist 
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BJD Biju Janata Dal Regionalist 
BOPF Bodoland Peoples Front Regionalist 
DMDK Desiya Murpokku Dravida Kazhagam Regionalist 
DMK Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam Regionalist 
GFP Goa Forward Party Regionalist 
GNLF Gorkha National Liberation Front Regionalist 
HSPDP Hill State People’s Democratic Party Regionalist 
INLD Indian National Lok Dal Regionalist 
IPFT Indigenousn People's Front Of Tripura Regionalist 
JKN Jammu & Kashmir National Conference Regionalist 
JKPDP Jammu & Kashmir Peoples Democratic Party Regionalist 
JMM Jharkhand Mukti Morcha Regionalist 
JVM Jharkhand Vikas Morcha (Prajatantrik) Regionalist 
KEC Kerala Congress Regionalist 
MAG Maharashtrawadi Gomantak Regionalist 
MDMK Marumalarchi Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam Regionalist 
MNF Mizo National Front Regionalist 
MNS Maharashtra Navnirman Sena Regionalist 
MPC Manipur Peoples Council Regionalist 
MPP Manipur People's Party Regionalist 
NDPP Nationalist Democratic Progressive Party Regionalist 
NPC Nagaland Peoples Council Regionalist 
NPF Nagaland Peoples Front Regionalist 
NPP National People's Party Regionalist 
PPA People's Party of Arunachal Regionalist 
SAD Shiromani Akali Dal Regionalist 
SDF Sikkim Democratic Front Regionalist 
SHS Shivsena Regionalist 
SKM Sikkim Krantikari Morcha Regionalist 
SSP Sikkim Sangram Parishad Regionalist 
TDP Telugu Desam Regionalist 
TRS Telangana Rashtra Samithi Regionalist 
UDP United Democratic Party Regionalist 
UGDP United Goans Democratic Party Regionalist 
VCK Viduthalai Chiruthaigal Katchi Regionalist 
WBTC West Bengal Trinamool Congress Regionalist 
YSRCP Yuvajana Sramika Rythu Congress Party Regionalist 
ZNP Zoram Nationalist Party Regionalist 
Sources: Authors’ own classification based on Kailash (2014) and Ziegfeld (2016).  
 
 
